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Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht, unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des
Usterreichischen und schweizerischen Rechts. By Arthur Nussbaum. Tiibingen:
F. C. B. Mohr, 1932.
The increasingly complicated international political situation in the world cannot
alter the phenomenon that the globe is shrinking as a result of the improved means of
communication and transportation. The boundaries of states, even though their gov-
ernments may not recognize each other, do not hinder the establishment of legal rela-
tions of all varieties between their respective citizens. Commerce has become more and
more internationalized. Economic and social interdependence of members of different
nations and races is a striking feature of modern civilization, and the law cannot ig-
nore it. Consequently the attention which is, and has to be, paid to the so-called con-
flict of laws is continuously growing. The literature relating to Anglo-American doc-
trine has very recently been enriched by Beale's great work, and Cheshire's excellent
treatise; 2 moreover, a number of articles concerning the fundamental problems in this
branch of law have appeared.3 In other countries likewise new and valuable treatises
dealing with this field have been written in the last few years4 and cannot be over-
looked by any student of conflicts of laws.
In Germany, i93 o , 1931 and 1932 particularly were years of plenty in the literature
of conflict of laws. In this comparatively short period, five new works, regarded with
special interest by international scholars,' were published, viz., the Commentaries of
I Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 3 vols. New York, 1935.
2 Cheshire, Private International Law, Oxford, 1935.
3 Cf. for instance, Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173
(i933); Beckett, The Question of Qualification (Classification) in Private International Law,
r5 British Year Book of International Law 46 (1934); Cook, Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333 (1932); Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35
Col. L. Rev. 202 (i935); Lorenzen and Heilmann, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83
U. Pa. L. Rev. 555 (1935); Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1935); Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and
Remedy in Cases of Conflict of Laws, i6 British Year Book of International Law 20 (1935);
see also Stumberg, Foreign Created Rights, 8 Tex. L. Rev. 173 (1930), and Gutteridge, Le con-
flit des lois de comp6tence judiciaire dans les actions personnelles, 44 Recueil des Cours, Acad.
de Droit Intern. uS (i93).
4 Particularly noteworthy are: De Bustamente, Derecho Internacional Privado (Havana
1931), Cavagleri, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato (Naples 1934), Ago, Teoria del
diritto internazionale privato (Padua x934), Pacchioni, Diritto internazionale privato (Padua
x935), Paredes, Teoria general del derecho civil internacional (Quito 1934) (vols. 2, 3): Cock,
Tratado del Derecho Intemacional Privado (Medellin 1935), and the posthumous publication
of Fedozzi, Trattato di diritto internazionale, f1 diritto intemazionale privato, of which the re-
viewer has seen only the proofs.
s Cf. for instance, Ago, I principii generali del diritto intemazionale privato nella piit recente
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Raape and the treatises of Gutzwiller, Lewald, Melchior6 and Nussbaum. This last
author, now a visiting member of the law faculty of Columbia University, was formerly
one of the outstanding professors of the University of Berlin, known for the force of
his analysis and the lucidity of his thought as well as for his "realistic" method, which
tends to eliminate all a priori speculations, and to scrutinize legal affairs as they really
happen (the so-called Rechtstaatsachenforschung).
Nussbaum's book is, so far as the German literature is concerned, the only modem
presentation of the whole field of private international law. Both substantive and ad-
jective law are dealt with. This is an especially noteworthy fact, for, while Anglo-
American writers always go into the international aspects of the problems of procedur-
al law and do so almost as a matter of course, the continental writers, particularly in
Italy and Germany7 usually8 neglect the procedural side of conflicts. Notable excep-
tions are the Swiss writer Meili9 and the recently deceased Italian scholar Fedozzi, who
in I9O5 published a celebrated book on the international law of civil procedure, ° to
which Professor Nussbaum unfortunately has paid no attention. The procedural part
of his work includes also the highly intricate subject of bankruptcy. As far as substan-
tive private law is concerned, the broad scope of its treatment by the author is impres-
sive. All the important types of transactions of private law are discussed with respect
to the bearing that international private law has upon them. In the chapter on the law
of contracts, for instance, not only are the general principles explained, but the differ-
ent kinds of commercial dealings, as sales, insurance, broker contracts and bills of ex-
change, are also carefully analyzed so far as they are affected by the rules of private
international law. This likewise is a remarkable fact and a specific feature of the
treatise, although the reviewer has some doubt, as to whether the arrangement of
Nussbaum's work is very adequate with respect to his placing of the commercial con-
tracts. The author tries to justify this arrangement by reference to Anglo-American
law. To be sure, in England and the United States the law merchant is now considered
to be a part of the common law." But this has not always been so.1 The law merchant
dottrina germanica, 26 Riv. di dir. int. 197 (1934), Rlheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict
of Laws in Germany, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 232 (1935).
6 Raape, Internationales Privatrecht, in Staudinger's Kommentar (Munich x931), Gutz-
willer, Intemationalprivatrecht (Berlin i93o), Lewald, Das Deutsche Internationale Privat-
recht (Leipzig 1931), Melchior, Die Grundlagen des Deutschen Internationalen Privatrechts
(Berlin, Leipzig x932).
7 The French writers usually pay attention to the procedural part of conflict problems. In
South-America, Valle Ibarlucea published in 1902 a separate treatise on Derecho Processal In-
ternacional (Buenos Aires).
8 In the great work of von Bar and in Cavaglieri'sLezioni (1929) at page 242 ff., the interna-
tional law of civil procedure is treated.
9 Meili, Das internationale Zivilprozessrecht (Zurich 19o6).
lo Fedozzi, I1 diritto processuale civile internazionale (Bologna 19o5).
11 The recent short treatise on Commercial Law by Hulvey (1930), for instance, would be
considered merely a description of the general private law of the United States from the conti-
nental point of view.
Cf. especially Sanborn, Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law
(1930); see also Kerr, The Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, rS Va. L. Rev. 350
(1929).
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was sharply separated from the common law for many centuries and regarded as an in-
ternational body of law.13 Lord Coke, in a later period, recognized it to be a "part of the
laws of this realm";4 however, he still kept it distinct from the common law." But as
part of the law of the land it gradually became enforced by the common law courts, and
in this way the law merchant and the customs of merchants became part of the common
law of England. Lord Mansfield was the judge who accomplished the complete incor-
poration of commercial law.16 However, this is not what happened in continental
Europe. There commercial law is still considered to be a separate body of rules,17 and
in Italy, for instance, it is even today not entirely settled, how far the general principles
of private law may be applied to commercial transactions, 8 although in other countries,
for instance in Spainxsa and Germany, a supplementary application of the general rules
of private law is allowed. Therefore, in spite of the author's justification of his arrange-
ment, the reviewer believes it would have been more adequate to treat commercial in-
ternational law as a particular branch of private international law, coherent in itself,
especially since Germany has a separate commercial code.
This very large field is covered by Nussbaum with continuous and careful attention
to the decisions of the courts of Germany, Switzerland and Austria. The leading princi-
ples, at least, of the law of other countries, too, are taken into consideration, especially
those of France, England and the United States, with reference principally to the books
of Dicey and Goodrich. This is a real merit of the book; for only on the basis of a com-
parative study of foreign laws is it possible even to perceive-to say nothing of solving
-the problems of private international law. It is, therefore, to be regretted that Nuss-
baum has not given any attention to the very elaborate and interesting modem Italian
doctrines in this field, especially the general theories, such as the nature of the rules of
conflict, the formal or material incorporation of the foreign rules, renvoi and qualifica-
tions.
Nussbaum calls his work "international private law" and not "conflict of laws,"
using the term which is generally employed by continental writers and by far predomi-
'3 "It was really Law and was really International" Carter, A History of English Courts i59
(London 1935).
14 Co. Litt. I82a (Hargrave & Butler's ed. 1794).
is Co. Litt. iib mentions the lex mercatoria in his enumeration of the laws within the realm
as a special law alongside the common law of England and other kinds of law. He did not say
it was part of the common law of England. Holdsworth (History of English Law, v. 5, P. 145
(1924))does not observe this difference. Also Cowell in his "Interpreter" (edition written in
1607, published in 1637) stated that "the Law Merchant is a privilege or special law differing
from the common law of England and proper to Merchants." However Finch in his Law (pub-
lished in Law French in x613, translated in 1627), bk. i i, c. i already states that the customs of
merchants throughout the realm are common law.
z6 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law 147 (1924).
17 The criterion for the distinction differs in the various countries. Some have chosen as the
basic concept the "commercial transaction" (objective system), some depart from the trans-
action of merchants (subjective system), some combine both (mixed system).
IS There are tendencies, sponsored by Prof. Vivante, for the creation of an uniform private
law. But the general attitude of legal writers (for instance, Pacchioni, La Lumia) favours the
"medieval system" (Kerr, id. 356) of bipartition.
8 Cf. 84 Revista General de Legislaci6n y Jurisprudencia 155, note of Menendez-Pidal.
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nant in England,19 in contrast to the American usage. Incidentally, however, it may be
mentioned that the expression "private international law" is of Anglo-American origin.
The word "international" was created by Jeremy Bentham in 1789, i.e., in his Princi-
ples of Morals and Legislation, and penetrated quickly into the European languages.
"It has now taken root in the English language" wrote Wheaton in 1836 in his Elements
of International Law,2o "and is familiarly used in discussions." From the English liter-
ature the word was taken over into the general terminology everywhere. The com-
pound term international private law was coined by Story, when he published his
famous Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws2 in 1834 and it was subsequently
adopted by the writers in that field. The first continental author to use it was Foelix in
1838, in his article "Du conflit des lois de diffrentes nations ou du droit internation-
al."2 He was followed by the German Schaeffner in 1841. In the next year Count
Portalis proposed the phrase "droit civil international" in a report to the Acad6mie des
Sciences morales et politiques2s relating to a book written by the Italian Rocco in
1837.24 Finally in 1843 Foelix published his celebrated treatise, "Le droit international
priv6," and it is his title that legal writers in general adopted; even the Anglo-American
writers's now credit the invention to Foelix rather than to the real father, Story.
As to the nature of private international law, Nussbaum takes the nationalistic, or
rather, as the author claims, positivistic point of view, i.e., that it is a part of municipal
law and not international law, an opinion which prevails also in Anglo-American law.26
He recognizes only a very few rules of international law which impose duties on the
states in this matter, a doctrine that is in harmony with the Anglo-American view.27
19 The name "private international law" is used by Westlake, Lord Phillimore (Commen-
taries, vol. 4), Foote, Nelson, Cheshire, and Beckett. Dicey and the Canadian writer Johnson
prefer "conflict of laws."
2o Wheaton, Elements of International Law 36 (1836) note. Manning also approved Ben-
tham's creation in his Commentaries in 1839.
2 Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 9 (1834). See Nussbaum, Deutsches Interna-
tionales Privatrecht 15, note 9, Pillet-Niboyet, Manuel de droit international priv6 30 (1924).
"7 Revue Ptrangare et Frangaise de Legislation 8i, 342, 6o8, 169, 962, at p. 96. This arti-
cle,-overlooked by all authors who have dealt with the history of the name, such as Zitelman,
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Nussbaum, and Weiss,-is the very first continental publication to
use Story's term in the Latin form ius gentium privatum.
23 S~ances et travaux de l'Acad6mie des Sciences morales et politiques 449 (1842). Holtzen-
dorff-Rivier, in Introduction au droit des gens 57 (Paris 1884) note r, cites a dissertation of
Portalis of the year 18o3, but this is apparently a misprint.
24Rocco, called the book first Dell' uso e autorith delle leggi del Regno delle due Sicilie, and
only in later editions "diritto civile internazionale."
's Cf. r Beale, Conflict of Laws i3; Cheshire, Private International Law 2o; Wheaton, Ele-
ments 112 (1855).
26See for instance Westlake, Private International Law (Bentwich's ed. London 1922);
Wharton, Conflict of Laws 2, 6 (3d ed. Parmele 19o5); Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the
Conflict of Laws 104 (Oxford x91g); Beckett, What is Private InternationalLaw, 7 British Year
Book of International Law 73; Beale id., 52; Cheshire id., 14 (semble); contra, among modern
writers, Stowell, International Law 299 (1931).
27 Cf. Beckett id. at 94. This opinion is shared in Germany by Melchior and in Italy by
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The rules of conflict, for Nussbaum, are rules of private law; and he opposes the theory
of Zitelman, which was very recently adopted by the Italian writer Ago, that the rules
of conflict have constitutional character. However Nussbaum attributes to the rules
of conflict a specific nature by considering them as "rules of collision" (Kollisions-
norm)2 and not as "material" rules (Sachnorm) as are the common rules of private
law. In other words, he distinguishes between ordinary rules which determine rights
and duties, the "material" rules (Sachnormen) in continental terminology, and rules
of private international law which supposedly do not have this character and de-
termine only what rule of law is to be applied (law application rules, Rechtsanwen-
dungsnormen). I venture to think that this distinction, although the predominant
one, is a fallacy. The rule of municipal law providing for the application of a for-
eign rule, is in itself a "material" rule, although of an incomplete, or rather abbrevi-
ated, character.29 What is the part that the foreign rule plays? Is it effective as such
before the municipal court? This question would have to be answered in the affirma-
tive, if Cheshire's opinion were right, that private international law "fixes the area of
the law's authority."30 Nussbaum has not treated this problem; but it is a fundamental
one. In other words, it is the question as to whether the reference to foreign law by the
domestic rule of conflicts incorporates, and "naturalizes" the foreign rule of law, or
whether it gives effect to the foreign rule as such. In Italy, this problem, which has been
discussed first by Zitelman and H. Triepel,3' has been very thoroughly investigated and
the question as to whether the reference to foreign law has the effect of a real incorpora-
tion (rinvio ricettizio) or not (rinvio mn riceltizio) is considered to be of the highest im-
portance.32 In American doctrine, the theory of real incorporation seems to prevail.
Justice Holmes has said: "When a case is said to be governed by foreign law that is only
a short way for saying, that for this purpose, the sovereign power takes up a rule from
without and makes it part of its own rules."33 Similarly Wharton says: "For when a
foreign law binds in a particular case, then it becomes part of our common law,"34 and
28 Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht 3.
29 A similar view has been taken very recently by Rundstein, La thiorie normative et la
structure du droit international, 9 Revue International de la Thiorie du Droit 255, 257, 258,
267 (1935), where he points out that the rules of conflict have a "material content" and "carac-
tare substantiel"; also Rheinstein, I. c. p. 263 seems to share this view.
3o Cheshire id. at 7.
31 H. Triepel, V6lkerrecht und Landesrecht (I899). He was the first author to investigate
the problem of the "rules of reference" effecting and not effecting an incorporation of rules of
a foreign law from a general point of view.
To be mentioned are Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale 57 (Rome 1925); Balladore
Pallieri, Il concetto di rinvio formale e il problema del diritto internazionale privato, Riv. di
diritto civile 473 (1929); Diena, La funzione delle norme del diritto internazionale privato e il
compito dell' autoritA giudiziaria, Riv. ital. di dir. intern. privato e dir. proc. 329 (1932); Ghi-
rardini, La communitA internazionale e il suo diritto, Riv. di dir. intern. 3 (i919); and Sull' in-
terpretazione del diritto internazionale privato, ibid., 289; Marinoni, L'universalitg:dell' ordine
giuridico statale e la concezione del diritto internazionale privato, Riv. di dir. publ. 225 (iqz6);
Marinoni, Della natura giuridica del diritto internazionale privato, Riv. di dir. intern. (1913);
Ottolenghi, Sulla funzione e sulla efficacia del diritto internazionale privato (Turin 1913); cf.
also the treatises of Pacchioni and Ago and the above-cited article of Rundstein.
33 In The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (I92i). This same theoryis adopted by Vice Chancel-
lor Turner in Caidwell v. Vanvlssingen, 9 Hare 425 (1851).
34 Wharton, Conflict of Laws 6; similarly Stowell, International Law.
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recently Cook has insistently advocated this conception.35 The foreign rule as such has
no other effect than to determine the content of the municipal rule. Therefore, in itself
it has not the significance of a legal rule for the courts of the lexfori. This is sometimes
expressed in the form that the foreign rule is only a fact in the transaction.36 This point
of view may be material to the question whether higher courts are bound by the ascer-
tainment of the lower courts relating to foreign law. The judicial practice differs in the
several countries. The question is also important for the interpretation of foreign
statutes.3 7 The problem of the significance and bearing of foreign acts and rules is one
of the most fundamental and crucial ones in private international law, and to my mind
it is necessary to work out some leading principles here: some jurisprudence is neces-
sary in this field even for a strict "realist" or positivist.3
8
A clear conception of the significance and function of the rules of international pri-
vate law is above all necessary, in my opinion, if we wish to reduce the three famous
and fundamental problems of private international law to their real meaning and scope
and to solve them: the problem of public policy (ordre public), the problem of renvoi
(remission) and the problem of qualification. Nussbaum deals with these crucial points
in the first book of his work, in which he discusses, further, the problem of interpreta-
tion of the rules of conflict, evasion of law (called oftens9 fraud upon the law or fraud
i la loi) which is important especially with respect to divorce law,4o the questions of
reciprocity, of protection of vested rights, of localization of rights, of formalities of
legal transactions and of judicial notice and proof of foreign law.
In the chapter concerning the renvoi Nussbaum avoids giving a detailed theoretical
analysis of the problem. He contents himself with pointing out the attitude of the
courts by means of copious reference to judicial practice. He seems, in contrast to the
German Reiclsgericht, not to be in favor of the general acceptance of the renvoi doc-
trine and to uphold its application only in the cases under § 27 of the Introductory
Statute to the German Civil Code and "in consimili casu." Nussbaum follows thus the
modem trend of thought in private international law in his attitude toward the renvoi
doctrine. Although this doctrine has recently found an ardent defender in the Belgian
professor Philonenko,4' the continental writers generally42 are not very fond of this
3s Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L. J. 457 (1924) and
Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 Col. L. Rev. 202 (1935); see also Stumberg, Foreign
Created Rights, 8 Tex. L. Rev. 173 (1930), note 2.
36 So for instance i Beale, Conflict of Laws 53; in Italy this opinion has been developed by
Cammerata, in I1 significato e la funzione del facto nell' esperienza giuridica (r929).
37 Cf. Albright, 13 N. C. L. Rev. 497 (x935) and Carbonnier, Loi ftrang~e et jurisprudence
trang~re, 62 Journ. du Dr. Intern. 473 (1935).
38 Cf. Harrison, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws 147, "Theory cannot precede
law, but without theory, law would ever remain a chaos, having neither fixity nor authority."
39 Cf. Lorenzen, The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws, 36 Yale L. J. 731, 737 (1927):
40 Cf. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 678 and 681, and i Vernier, American Family Laws 209
(1931). 23 Col. L.R. 82 (1923): Syllabus in Ross v. Bryant, go Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364
(1923). The question of evasionis of importance in taxation law also, cf.92 A. L. R. io73 (i934).
A general theory, however, does seem not to have been developed in American law in contrast
to the civil law.
41 Philonenko, La Thiorie du reavoi en droit compar6 (Paris 1935).
42 Cf. Pacchioni, Diritto Intemazionale Privato 147; Cavaglieri, Lezioni di Diritto Inter-
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"irrepressible shuttlecock" as an American writer has called it.43 The courts on the
continent also begin more and more to abandon the theory of renvoi, even in France,
where the famous affaire Forgo gave rise to this much discussed question.44 Thus the
Cour de Paris has lately declined to follow the renvoi doctrine in the case of the 6poux
Stewart and Niorthe (March 1, 1933)4s influenced by the remarks of the deputy-attor-
ney general which were supported by a long list of modern judicial authorities. The
Court de Cassation, however, is still a partisan of the renvoi.46 Nussbaum offers a con-
vincing criticism of the English practice which accepts the renvoi although in a formu-
lation which differs from that on the continent,47 whereas in the United States the doc-
trine of renvoi is generally repudiated. I believe Nussbaum's refusal to share the gen-
eral acceptance of the renvoi is quite sound. But he should perhaps have pointed out
the basic fallacy of the contrary opinion, from the very nature of the rules of conflict.
The chief argument of the defenders of the renvoi is that by failure to give attention to
the renvoi contained in foreign law, this law would be applied by the judge of the lex
fori, where it has declared itself as wt controlling the legal relations.48 But the foreign
law is not applied ex proprio vigore but as part of the lex fori. Thus the problem of
renvoi is nothing else but a problem of interpretation of the rules of conflict. The ambit
of the foreign law as such, as binding by its own force, is immaterial and the reference
to it is only a remainder of the antiquated and naturalistic conception of auto-limita-
tion of a legal system by its rules of conflict. Reduced to a problem of interpretation of
the internal rules the leading point of view is practical expediency and some consist-
ency.
As to the problem of qualifications or classifications, also, a greater stress on its
fundamental aspects would have been desirable. This question has in recent years
drawn the attention of Anglo-American writers also, after Lorenzen presented it in an
admirable article published in 1920.49 Dicey, Beckett, Falconbridge, Cheshire and
nazionale Privato 66. (He states that the Italian practice generally declines to recognize the
renvoi, whereas Philonenko alleges the contrary.) Pillet-Niboyet, Manuel de Droit Interna-
tional Priv6 386; Bartin, Principes de Droit International Priv6 2oo (Paris 1930); 1 Arminjon,
Precis de Droit International Priv6 i27 (1925); both the latter however want to make certain
exceptions.
43 Radin, 21 Calif. L. Rev. 300 (1932); Buzzati, an Italian writer, similarly called the renvoi
"lawn tennis" of private international law.
44 Cf. Cheshire, Private InternationalLaw, 5i L. Q. R. 76 (1935) and in his treatise, Private
International Law 133.
's 62 Journ. du Dr. Intern. 68 (1935) with note of Perroud.
46 In Guez v. Ben Attar, 62 Joum. du Dr. Intern. 88 (ig35).
47 Cf. Cheshire, Private International Law 133, and his critique, similar to Nussbaum's, id.
at 141. With respect to the recent renvoi doctrine in Anglo-American law see further Falcon-
bridge, Contract and Conveyance in the Conflict of Laws, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661, 681 (1933),
Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and Divorce, 4 D. L. R. 44 (1932), Renvoi and Succession to
Movables, i D. L. R. i, 11 (1932) and Beale, Conflict of Laws 55. The most complete survey
of the Anglo-American doctrine is written by Grassetti, La dottrina del rinvio in diritto inter-
nazionale privato e la "common law" anglo-americana, 26 Riv. di dir. int. 3, 233, 350 (1934).
4s Cf. the remarks of the deputy attorney general in the case of Stewart and Niorthe, 62
Journ. du Dr. Intern. 68 (1935).
49 Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 Col. L. Rev. 247
(1920); see also his Cases on the Conflict of Laws 6o (1932), note.
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Bealeso have dealt with it; the English translation of an article of the Italian Professor
Meriggihas appeared and very recently Mendelssohn-Bartholdys has again drawn the
question into the discussion of the English speaking world.
The problem is based on the fact that legal institutions and legal concepts have dif-
ferent character in the various legal system. If, accordingly, one legal system refers to
another with respect to the effect of a legal transaction, institution or situation, which
system shall determine the characteristic features of the transaction, institution or
situation, the lex fori or the foreign law referred to? While in a primary stage of the
elaboration of the qualification doctrine such problems were found only in the field of
private law, it is now observed that the question has a much more fundamental char-
acter.S3
The qualification problem may arise either from a rule contained in the body of in-
ternal (municipal) law or from a provision in an international treaty;5 4 it may arise
either (i) within the realm of substantive private law, and there either from an ordi-
nary rule or a rule of conflict,i or (2) within the realm of procedure or in the zone be-
tween procedural and substantive law;s6 moreover, the general question as to whether a
certain legal relation belongs to one or to the other of the two great principal branches
of law (i.e., public or private law) is a qualification problem of cardinal importance.
This latter point is generally neglected.s7 It may be, however, decisive: a legal relation
which has public character is not actionable before many continental courts. A British
consul in Italy maintained a cemetery for British subjects. He dismissed the adminis-
trator of this cemetery. The employee brought a suit against him. In Italy a foreign
state is subjected to Italian jurisdiction only in private transactions. Which law quali-
so Dicey, Conflict of Laws 46 (5th ed. 1932); Beckett, The Question of Qualification (Classi-
fication) in Private International Law, i5 British Year Book of International Law 46 (934);
Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and Divorce, 4 D. L. R. i, 9 (1932); Cheshire,
Private International Law 9; i Beale, Conflict of Laws 55. Cf. further the remarks of the re-
viewer in 23 Calif. L. Rev. 547 (i935).
s'Meriggi, Conflicts of Law-A Theoretical Approach, i4 B. U. L. Rev. 3i9 (1934). The
original was printed in Riv. ital. di diritto internazionale privato e processuale i89 (1932).
s, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and Remedy in the Cases of Conflict of
Laws, 16 British Year Book of International Law 20 (i935); cf. also his remarks in 5i L. Q. R.
535 (1935).
53 The fundamental character has been pointed out first by Fedozzi in his lectures, De
l'efficacit6 extra-territoriale des lois et des actes de droit public, Recueil des Cours, Acad. de
Droit Intern. v. I, 146 (1929).
54 See Nussbaum, Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht 51; Niboyet, Le probl~me des
qualifications sur le terrain des trait~s diplomatiques, 2 Rev. Crit. de Droit Intern. i (x935);
and Philonenko, 63 Joum. du Dr. Intern. 408 (x934).
ss These cases were the ones first discussed by Bartin, Kahn and others.
56 This problem has nowadays drawn the attention of legal writers. Cf. McClintock, Dis-
tinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933 (1930);
Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333 (i933); Ailes, Limita-
tion of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 3r Mich. L. R.'474 (i933); Yntema, The Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1140 (193s); Mendel-
ssohn-Bartholdy, Delimitation of Right and Remedy in Cases of Conflict of Laws, x6 British
Year Book of International Law 20 (i935); Beale, Conflict of Laws 1599, z6oo, 16oi.
57 Not by Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and. Fedozzi.
BOOK REVIEWS
fies the legal character of the relation? The courtss held that the lexfori is the lex quali-
ficationis, and that the legal relation according to Italian law must be considered public
in character, and the claim therefore was not actionable. This is right: the question of
actionability of a legal relation has to be determined according to the lexfori, and if the
actionability is dependent on the distinction between public and private law the lex
fori controls this classification.
The question also as to whether an issue involves right or remedy, substance or pro-
cedure, must in general be qualified in this way. This is the universal opinion9 and
Nussbaum agrees with it.
But what is the situation within the realm of procedural law? It is usually said that
in matters of procedural law the lexfori determines the classification. That is generally
true.60 But the problem becomes complicated and doubtful when we come to the most
important matter, to the effect and enforcement of foreign judgments. Here is perhaps
one of the weaker points of Nussbaum's work.
A judgment has, generally speaking, two different effects, that of being the basis of
an execution and that of having binding force upon the parties with respect to the issue
decided upon. This is generally recognized.61 Therefore two different problems arise,
that of the recognition and that of the enforcement of foreign judgments. They are of
different nature, but often practically connected. That can easily be seen by the fact
that on the one hand many states recognize only such judgments as resjudicata which
can be enforced, and that on the other hand many make the enforcement dependent
upon recognition. To the first group Italy, France and Belgium belong, where a for-
eign judgment has no effect at all, unless it is subjected to a certain procedure (deliba-
zione, exequatur) ,2 to the second belong Germany, Greece and Roumania where the
s8 Little v. Riccio, Corte d'Appello, Naples, 26 Riv. di dir. intern. io (1934). The same
view has been taken also with respect to the public character of the legal relation between em-
ployees and the commercial representatives of the U.S.S.R. Cassaz. d. Regno, Jan. 18, 1933.
Rappr. del U. S. S. R. v. Karmann, 25 Riv. di dir. int. 240 (1933), Court of Geneva Feb. 17,
193o, Alexeff c. Delegazione della Rappr. comm. dell' Unione Sov., 23 Riv. di dir. int. 558
(i93i); cf. note of Scerni ibid., of Sereni, 24 Riv. di dir. int. 436 (1932); Cavaglieri, Ann. di dir.
comparato vol. I-II, 768 (1929). The question is important also with respect to the right of
foreign states to claim the fortune of citizens deceased abroad without heirs. Cf. Nussbaunm,
Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht 357.
s Cf. the writings cited in notes 56 and 57, supra. As to exceptions, see my remarks, 23
Calif. L. Rev. 547 ('935).
6, For instance, a bill of exchange is executable in the country of payment, if bills of ex-
change are executable there without judgment, regardless of whether the possibility exists in
the country, where it is emitted; cf. Cass. del Regno June 17, 1929, in Martinengo v. Banco
Italo-Franco, 6 Annuario di dir. comp. 476, with note of Bosco; of the same opinion are Bal-
doni, 23 Riv. di dir. int. 548 (1931); BosCo, 21 id., 279; Perassi, 22id., 115 . But even if the law
of the country where it was emitted would govern the executability, the qualification, whether
the bill is "executable" under those provisions, would have to be made according to the lexfori.
Cf. Cass. di Roma Feb. 1i, 1929 1, Giurisprudenza Italiana 265 (1929).
6ftCf. for instance Yntema, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129,
1132 (193S).
62As to Italy, cf. Bosco, La sentenza straniera come titolo di un'azione di condanna e come
documento probatorio prodotto in giudizio, 22 Riv. di dir. int. 245 (1930); Siotto-Pintor, Ques-
tioni relative alia cosa giudicata, 26 Rivista di dir. int. 57 (i934); Sereni, id., at 420; Perassi,
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foreign judgment is recognized "de plano" provided that certain requirements are ful-
filed and where the execution is allowed only of a recognized judgment. 3 In England,
where the enforcement of foreign judgments is introduced by the Foreign Judgment
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act the recognition is independent of the registration for
purposes of execution.6 4 The Bustamente Code likewise treats recognition and execu-
tion of foreign judgments separately (Book IV, title VI and title X).
But this diversity of conditions for the recognition and execution of foreign judg-
ments in the different states has no bearing on the law of recognition and enforcement
in a particular state, except under the rule of reciprocity. However, the problem of
qualification arises in order to determine whether a foreign act is a judgment and
whether it has the force of res jvdicata.
The character of an act as a judgment has to be qualified according to the law of the
recognizing and enforcing court. This opinion, which follows from the rule that quali-
fications of a procedural kind are made by the lexfori, is shared by Nussbaum, by the
German practice, and by Italian authorities.6s In Roumania the opposite view seems to
be held.f
Great difficulties, however, arise with respect to the question when and how far for-
eign judgments have the force of resJudicala. Which law qualifies? The difference in
the various countries is great. In England and in the United States, except in some
jurisdictions, a judgment has the force of resjudicata unless it is reversed, whether or
not an appeal is pending.7 In Germany a judgment is resjudicata only if it is no longer
attackable by any ordinary procedural remedy, i.e., appeal by the parties to the suit,
including also appeals to the Supreme Court. In Italy, however, the appeal to the
Supreme Court is considered to be an "extraordinary" remedy; the force of resjidicata
24 id., 277 (1934), note 2, and decision of appellate court, 22 Riv. di dir. int. 243 (Milan z929),
and app. court ibid. 246 (Geneva 1929)'note i; as to France, cf. Lorenzen, 36 Yale L. J. 755
(1926); as to Belgium, cf. Cour de Bruxelles, 18 Nov. 1931 (1932), 59 Journ. du Dr. Intern. iio:
"The procedure of exequatur constitutes the recognition as resjudicata of a foreign judgment."
In Belgium and France, however, foreign judgments relating to the "statut civil" are conclu-
sive without exequatur. Trib. Anvers, i9 June 193i
, 
59 Journ. du Dr. Intern. io4 (r932); Cour
de Paris, March 24 I93o, 59 Journ. du Dr. Intern. 668 (932).
63 Germany: § 328 Code of Civil Procedure; Greece: Court of Athens 1932 (1933) 6o
Journ. du Dr. Intern. 1024 and note; Roumania: Cf. Report of Possa, 6o Journ. de Dr. Intern.
479 (1933).
64 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 23 Geo. V, c. 13 (i933); cf. with re-
spect to this act Dobson, The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 75 L. J. 413
(1933); Reciprocal Execution of Foreign Judgments, 175 L. T. 29, 33 (1933). Yntema, 33
Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1i59. According to Dobson, this statute extends somewhat the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments, 75 L. J. 413, 415 (1933).
6s Cf. Nussbaum, at 430, and Sereni, Sull'efficacia in Italia di un proveddimento Austriaco
di falUmento, 26 Riv. di dir. int. 412 U934).
6 Cf. Possa, loc. cit.
67 Cf. for the United States, Emery v. U.S., 27 F. (2d) 992, 994 (1928); Du Pont de Nemours
Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580, 583 (924). See also R. v. Moschzisker, Res Judi-
cata, 38 Yale L. J. 299 (1929); 2 Freeman, Judgments 1525 (1925); comment in 32 Col. L.
Rev. 1245 (1932). In California the law is different: Woodbury v. Bowman, 13 Calif. 634;
People v. Beevers, 99 Calif. 286, 33 Pac. 844 (z893); Fry v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 8o Calif. App.
415, 252 Pac. 752 (1926); I5 Cal. Juris. 26o (1924). With respect to England see Bower, The
Doctrine of Res Judicata 34, 1o (1924).
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is, therefore, not excluded by a pending ricorso in cassazione.68 Further, the extent of the
binding force (with respect to the operative facts and the reasoning contained in the
judgment) is not the same in the different states.6 In this matter, now, there is an ex-
ception to the rule that procedural matters are controlled by the lex fori only. The
German Code of Civil Procedure actually refers to foreign law with respect to the ques-
tion as to whether a foreign judgment has the force of resjudicata.0 The Italian Code
contains in Art. 941 a similar provision. But which concept of resjidicata is meant by
the German Code, the German or the foreign one? Nussbaum seems to be not quite
consistent as to this point. He states, relying on some German decisions, that the time
and the extent of the force of resjudicata is determined by the foreign law;7z but on the
other hand he explains that a foreign judgment has the force of resjudicata if it can no
longer be attacked by any ordinary procedural remedy.72 Consequently Nussbaum ap-
plies the German definition of resjidicata. From this latter point of view an English
judgment, although considered as resjudicata according to the common law conception,
could not be recognized in Germany as long as an appeal is still possible. It would be
doubtful with respect to Italian judgments. The ricorso in cassazione is not an ordinary
remedy according to the Italian classification. But would the foreign law (in our case
the Italian) have to determine what an ordinary remedy is? I believe that, where such
a problem of qualification arises, the lex fori is in reality the controlling law. Foreign
judgments are conclusive and enforceable only, if according to the law of the place where
they are recovered they possess a force and character which corresponds to the concept
of res judicata in the lexfori. The foreign law establishes the effect of the judgment, but
the lexfori qualifies it as resrjdicata. It is wrong, therefore, to give the foreign judg-
ment a binding force to an extent different from that which a judgment under the lex
fori possesses. If the lexfori contains a provision that the foreign judgment must be
"irrevocable and executory"73 the qualification problem is to a large extent eliminated.
In English law a foreign judgment must be final and conclusive. But an appeal does
not necessarily deprive a foreign judgment of its force as res j dicata.74 The English
law consequently uses the concept final and conclusive in its own qualification. To be
sure, in Nouvion v. Freevan,7s the court held that the judgment must amount to res
judicata in the country where it was delivered. In Macfarlane v. Macartney the court
6 Cod. Proc. Civ. art. 465. Cf. 2 Mortara, Manuale della procedura civile io, X2 (Turin
1921).
69 Cf. Freeman, judgments 1414; and Report of Foreign judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Committee, Cmd. 4213, p. 7 n.* (London 1932).
7o Zivilprozessordnung §723 ]a (only with respect to enforcement, but applied to the recog-
nition by analogy).
7x At 427, note 4. This rule seems to be followed in Quickstadt v. McNeill, 4 D. L. R. 427
(British Columbia 1932).
7At 431.
73 This is the case in Italy: Code Civ. Proc. art. 941, and in Greece: cf. 61 Journ. du Dr.
Intern. 1o56. The court of San Marino did not permit execution of an Italian judgment, al-
though it was executory, because it was not irrevocable, pending an appeal to the Supreme
Court. (Sulla v. Brambilla, 25 Riv. di dir. int. at 104 (1933)).
74 Cf. Cheshire, Private International Law 5o6, 508; 175 L. T. 54 (1933); Dobson, 76 L. J.
414 (1933); Scott v. Pilkinton, 2 B. & S. I, 121 E. R. 978 (1862); In re Henderson. Nouvion v.
Freeman, 37 Ch. D. 244, 255 (1887), and affirmed in i5 App. Cas. t, io (1889). See also For-
eign judgments Act Part I, i, subd. 3 (933).
7s37 Ch. D. 244, 255 (1887) judgment of Lindley, 3.
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followed this rule and quoted Dicey, viz.: "the test of finality is the treatment of the
judgment by the foreign tribunal as res judicata."76 It seems to me nevertheless not
correct to infer from this statement that the English Courts apply the qualification of
the place where the judgment is obtained. In the Nouvian case the court went on to
say that an appeal does not exclude the recognition of a foreign judgment;"7 that is to
say it applied the English qualification. The finality of which the English courts speak
corresponds to the German Endurteil which does not have the force of res judicata in
the German meaning as long as an appeal is possible. I believe that the court must
give attention to the effect which the foreign law attributes to a judgment and appeal,
and must then under consideration of this effect compare it with its own concept of
conclusiveness and finality. The final reason is here again that the rule of conflict at-
tributes to the foreign judgment, by compliance with certain prerequisites, the value of
a domestic judicial act.
The German law gives effect even to a suit pending before a foreign court, recogniz-
ing it as a bar to a domestic action. Nussbaum treats the question briefly and not in its
logical place in a systematic treatment. It belongs before the recognition of foreign
judgments, not after it.78 On this point Germany is more liberal than most of the other
countries,78a except perhaps Switzerland79 where a conflict exists. The common law dis-
regards the foreign suit,8° at least speaking practically, and Italy and France8' do so
entirely.
But these considerations which relate rather to questions of method, do not change
the fact that Nussbaum's work is an admirable accomplishment. Completeness of
material and dearness of thought make his Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht of de-
cisive importance for practitioner and student in this field. I believe I could find no
more adequate judgment on Nussbaum's book than that which was once expressed by
Dupin with regard to the first and classical continental treatise in the field of private
international law:82 "The work is a fine law book: the various parts are arranged with
order: the doctrine is supported by the least contestable authorities and the quotations
recommend themselves more by their selection than by their number. I mention this
76i24 L. T. R. 6s8, r Ch. 522 (1921).
77 37 Ch. D. 244, 255 (1887); and the distinction drawn by Lord Herschell between the
Nouviol case and the case of an appeal pending (i5 App. Cas. i, io) confirms the application
of the English qualification.
78 Cf. 3 Arminjon, Precis de Droit International Priv6 253.
7 The Bustamente Code, adopted by the majority of the South American States, accepts
the German rule (art. 394).
79 Comp. the two decisions in 56 Joum. du Dr. Intern. 796, 797 (1929).
8o Cf. Cheshire, Private International Law 553; Gutteridge, 44 Recueil des Cours, Acad. de
Dr. Intern. 115, 133 (1933); Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 5th ed. 355, 364;2 Beale, Conflict of Laws
1429; Wharton, Conflict of Laws i58o, i58I, Thompson v. Shanley, 93 Mont. 235, 17 P. (2d)
1o85 (1932).
81 See with respect to Italy, Cassaz. del Regno Dec. 12, i93i,Anituav. Treves, 24Riv. di dir.
int. 428; Cassaz. del R. July 13, 1928; Mustica v. Kehauski, 4-5 Ann. di dir. comp. 674 (1930).
Sereni, 26 Riv. di dir. int. 420 (1934) and n. 2; also the draft of the new civil code contains a
provision excluding the exceptio liis aliunde pendentis. Cf. Diena 7 Ann. di dir. comp. 34;
Arminjon, 8 Ann. di dir. comp. 28 (i933). With respect to France see "litispendance" in De
Lapradelle Niboyet, R6p. d. Dr. Intern. vol. IX. The German rule is criticised by Arminjon,
Droit International Priv6, vol. 3, 258.
82 Cf. Dupin ain6, Report to the Acad~mie des Sciences morales et politiques about Foelix's
Trait6 du Droit International Priv6, S6ances et travaux of this Academy, v. 3, 182, 187 (1843).
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purposely at a time when some of our scholars load the bottom of their pages with
names and titles of a great number of foreign authors and works, which they have never
read and which their reader would in vain try to procure."
STEPAN E. R:EsENEELD*
* Research Associate, University of California School of Jurisprudence.
A Study of the Business of the Federal Courts. Philadelphia: American Law Insti-
tute, Publishers, 1934. Part I, pp. 153, xxxix; Part II, pp. 217, xxvii. $5.00.
In 1929 the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement appointed
an advisory committee to investigate "the administration of law in the Federal courts,
through a scientific analysis of case records, both civil and criminal, the general purpose
of the study being to test the efficiency of the administration of justice in these courts."x
After June 30, i93i, the American Law Institute, in co-operation with the Yale School
of Law, assumed responsibility for the direction of the study.
In the progress report, published in ig3i and based on work begun in October, 1930,
the advisory committee stated that the data being sought were in general of three
kinds: (i) the statutes, laws and parties involved in each case coming before Federal
courts; (2) the several procedural devices employed in the courts to expedite the trial
of cases or otherwise dispose of them; and (3) the various dispositions made of the
cases.
Since it was impracticable, because of financial limitations, to attempt a study of all
Federal courts, only thirteen districts, out of eighty-four in the United States, repre-
senting urban, semi-urban and rural conditions, were selected. The study includes an
analysis of 35,671 criminal cases in addition to 37,065 dealing with prohibition enforce-
ment under the Eighteenth Amendment, and 9,852 civil cases. Of the civil cases io per
cent entered the federal courts by the removal process and of these 92.6 per cent were
diversity cases. The criminal cases, in general, cover a period for the fiscal years ending
June 30, 1928, 1929, and 193o; while the civil cases cover a period for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 193o . Eleven law schools, in addition to the Yale School of Law, as-
sisted in the project. This plan made possible local supervision by a law school repre-
sentative in each district studied.
The data secured under the first group, as pointed out in the progress report in the
chapter on the aims and purposes of the study, were gathered to furnish statistics
showing the distribution of the load of Federal court business by types of cases. This
information, it was hoped, would throw light on the controversial issue as to whether
the civil dockets of Federal courts were congested because of cases based on diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction.2
The second type of data was intended to aid in formulating a more simplified and
uniform system of practice and to aid, when combined with the data of the first group,
in understanding whether the problem of congestion in the Federal courts, if it exists,
is due to faulty judicial administration rather than to the number of cases of a particu-
1 Progress Report on the Study of Federal Courts, Report no. 7, National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement iii (ig3i).
2 For references to the periodical literature on this controversy see: Limiting Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts-Commentby Members of the University of Chicago Law Faculty, 3 Mich. L.
Rev. 59 (1932); Yntema, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Diverse Citizenship Cases, i9A.B.AJ. 26g (1933)-
